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Fletcher v. Peck and Constitutional 
Development in the Early 
United States 
Gerald Leonard* 
One hundred years after Charles Beard’s An Economic Interpretation 
of the Constitution of the United States, few scholars attend actively to 
that book or its specific claims. Yet it has become conventional 
wisdom that the movement for a new Constitution in 1787 was no 
democratic movement but a conservative effort to rein in the allegedly 
reckless policy impulses of the state governments. Power would be 
transferred substantially to the center, where an elite might better 
control the direction of policy. This conservative movement had 
important, Beardian economic dimensions, particularly its 
determination to secure the rights of the propertied against the 
supposed desires of the unpropertied to redistribute wealth.1 But 
closely allied to this economic conservatism was necessarily a legal 
conservatism, perhaps even a legal counterrevolution, as Aaron 
Knapp’s essay for this Symposium argues.2 The Contracts Clause of 
the new Constitution was only the most explicit protection in the 
document for traditional rights of property and contract as against the 
state governments’ demonstrated readiness to interfere with contract 
performance and debt collection. The triumph of the Framers of 1787, 
then, appears to some an abiding victory for a fundamentally 
conservative structure of American law and a major defeat for serious 
advocates of equality and democracy.3 
 
 * Copyright © 2014 Gerald Leonard. 
 1 For an important modern statement of this point, see generally JENNIFER 
NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM: THE 
MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY (1990). 
 2 Aaron Knapp, The Legal Counterrevolution: The Jurisprudence of Constitutional 
Reform in 1787, 47 UC DAVIS L. REV. (2014).  
 3 See GORDON WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776–1787, at 53-
65 (1969) (demonstrating the elitism of the Constitution even as it formally rests on 
popular sovereignty). See generally NEDELSKY, supra note 1. 
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The truth, though, is that, for all the conservatism of 1787, the 
framing and ratification constituted only one moment in the fluid 
history of American constitutionalism. If the years before 1787 
accommodated a widespread — though far from unanimous — 
constitutional egalitarianism, the adoption of the Constitution 
represented only a momentary defeat for that view.4 Ratification did 
not send the egalitarians home to lick their wounds and never return. 
Rather, a range of constitutionalisms survived ratification, all of them 
now necessarily identifying themselves with the Constitution without 
feeling obligated to take the Constitution’s conservatism as given. The 
Constitution became subject to interpretation as soon as it went into 
effect, and the years after 1789 revealed a multi-handed contest both 
to control the meanings of particular provisions of the Constitution 
and to locate the authoritative interpreters of the Constitution. 
This Essay will sketch some of the main lines of struggle over 
control of the Constitution in the first generation after ratification by 
focusing on a single major issue, the Yazoo land scandal, which 
brought out a range of theories of the Constitution and republican 
authority, eventually generating the landmark Supreme Court case 
Fletcher v. Peck,5 often said to be the first case in which the Supreme 
Court struck down a state statute for unconstitutionality. The Yazoo 
story began with the corrupt sale of millions of acres of Georgia public 
lands in 1795, climaxed with the Fletcher case in 1810, and concluded 
with congressional resolution of all claims in 1814. During these 
years, Radical Republicans, moderate Jeffersonian Republicans, 
Federalists, and the Supreme Court struggled to determine whether 
the meaning of the Constitution belonged to the people themselves, 
the people’s elected representatives, or the life-appointed justices of 
the Supreme Court. 
In the Yazoo fraud of 1795, companies of land speculators bribed 
much of the Georgia legislature to execute a mammoth land sale — 
most of present day Alabama and Mississippi — to the companies for a 
mere $500,000.6 The speculators’ title was thus clouded by the flagrant 
corruption and also by continuing Indian claims to much of the land, 
 
 4 See GERALD LEONARD, THE INVENTION OF PARTY POLITICS: FEDERALISM, POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT IN JACKSONIAN ILLINOIS 18-19 (2002) 
(explaining that the rise of the Jacksonian Democratic Party in the 1820s and 1830s 
represented the ascendancy of constitutional egalitarianism two generations after 
ratification of a designedly elitist Constitution). 
 5 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 6 C. PETER MAGRATH, YAZOO: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE NEW REPUBLIC: THE CASE OF 
FLETCHER V. PECK 3, 7 (1966). 
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claims that could only be extinguished by the United States. In spite of 
these clouds, the new owners went north and resold their claims to 
purchasers who may or may not have been aware of the original fraud. 
Meanwhile, in Georgia, a political movement arose to invalidate the 
sale, and in 1796, a newly elected legislature passed “AN ACT 
declaring null and void a certain usurped act,”7 that is, an act voiding 
the prior land grant. 
Georgia’s action — almost unintelligible to us today — asserted the 
legislature’s right to review the constitutionality of legislation, without 
recourse to the courts and regardless of the federal constitutional 
protection for contracts. The 1796 Act was not a conventional repeal 
but a finding and declaration that the 1795 Act had never been law. In 
this respect, it foreshadowed Jefferson’s famous Kentucky Resolutions, 
which (for all their differences) similarly insisted on a sovereign state’s 
authority to legislatively declare a statute unconstitutional (in that 
case, the federal Sedition Act) without recourse to the judiciary.8 The 
Georgia rescinders (for lack of a better term) might thus have 
expected the strong support of the Jeffersonian Republican Party, 
defenders of states’ rights and extra-judicial constitutional 
enforcement. But the Georgians had also provocatively challenged 
some common law rules of contract. Their actions thus directly 
assaulted not just Federalist constitutionalism but that of the moderate 
parts of the Jeffersonian movement, which shared the Federalists’ 
reverence for common-law legalism. For that and other reasons, the 
Republicans would split badly over the claims of the putatively 
innocent northern purchasers of the Yazoo lands. 
The more-radical Republicans defended Georgia’s actions in the 
language of popular sovereignty and states’ rights. For them, such 
popular constitutional review rested on even firmer footing than did 
judicial review. The rescinding statute was not a mere legislative act. 
Rather, it represented the will of the people themselves, who had 
deputized their representatives to act in a special constitutional 
capacity in response to exigent circumstances. Local resolutions 
addressed to a state constitutional convention, declarations of grand 
juries throughout the state, and popular meetings out of doors had 
specially “invest[ed] this Legislature with conventional powers”; that 
 
 7 The Georgia Repeal Act of 1796, reprinted in MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 127-29 
[hereinafter Georgia Repeal Act]. 
 8 See Gerald Leonard, Jefferson’s Constitutions, in CONSTITUTIONS AND THE 
CLASSICS: PATTERNS OF CONSTITUTIONAL THOUGHT FROM JOHN FORTESCUE TO JEREMY 
BENTHAM (D.J. Galligan ed., forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 21-22); see also 
STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 719-21 (1993). 
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is, with the powers of the people themselves, as if assembled in 
convention.9 The people of Georgia had thus exploited the wide 
repertoire of “constitutional” options in the early nation to put their 
sovereignty into practice.10 In so doing, the people and their delegates 
in the legislature reviewed the original Act and declared the land grant 
void — without effect from the moment of its supposed enactment — 
on the basis of the fraud and other constitutional defects. 
This apparently Jeffersonian expression of popular constitutional 
review, however, proved controversial, even among Jeffersonians. 
Jefferson, Madison, and a moderate minority of the Republican Party 
would seek a compromise solution. For Federalists like John Marshall, 
moreover, the notion of the people taking questions of legal 
interpretation into their own hands perverted the Constitution. 
Adjudication belonged in courts, just as legislation was delegated to 
carefully designed legislatures. The people remained sovereign and so 
elected their representatives and even amended the Constitution. But, 
for Federalists, “popular sovereignty” must be bounded by law, by 
close adherence to the traditions of the common law and to the courts’ 
commitment to reason rather than will.11 In this belief, they were not 
far from Jefferson himself, whose First Inaugural insisted that the 
people’s sovereign acts must not forsake reason for pure, popular 
will.12 And they could point to the Constitution of the United States, 
which placed the judicial power in the courts.13 
The subsequent history of Yazoo played out as an extended series of 
tactical moves by Georgia, by Congress, by the parties and their 
leaders, by the President, and by the federal courts, navigating 
between the democratic and the legalist approaches to the 
Constitution with at least one eye on the whirl of practical politics. At 
each step, the moves revealed important beliefs about the nature and 
development of the Constitution but equally the inevitability that 
constitutional development would rest on the imperatives of political 
competition and pragmatic compromise, not mainly judicial 
 
 9 Georgia Repeal Act, supra note 7, at 135. 
 10 On the variety of means by which the people sought to exercise their 
constitutional authority, see generally SAUL CORNELL, THE OTHER FOUNDERS: ANTI-
FEDERALISM AND THE DISSENTING TRADITION IN AMERICA, 1788–1828 (1999); LARRY D. 
KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 
(2004). 
 11 See R. KENT NEWMYER, JOHN MARSHALL AND THE HEROIC AGE OF THE SUPREME 
COURT 204-09 (2001). 
 12 THOMAS JEFFERSON, First Inaugural Address, in 33 THE PAPERS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 
148, 148-52 (1801), available at http://www.princeton.edu/~tjpapers/inaugural/infinal.html. 
 13 See U.S. CONST. art. III. 
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reasoning. Soon after Georgia purported to void the sale and word 
began to spread that the Indian claims might undermine it anyway, a 
pamphlet war flared among the buyers and sellers of the Georgia 
grants. A pamphlet by the South Carolina Federalist and participant in 
the Yazoo speculation, Robert Goodloe Harper,14 drawing 
reinforcement from an opinion letter of Alexander Hamilton,15 argued 
that no legislature could void the enactments of a prior legislature. 
Rather, “the force, validity, or meaning of a legislative act, is purely a 
judicial question, and altogether beyond the province of the 
legislature.”16 Moreover, “[t]his is a fundamental principle of all our 
constitutions which declare, that the judicial and legislative powers 
shall be distinct and separate. . . . As well might the legislature try 
causes, or hear appeals, as attempt to expound, enforce, or declare 
void, one of its own acts.”17 Further, even if the merits of the grant 
were to be considered, Harper’s legalist view was that the grants were 
manifestly contracts and that, “[i]t is an invariable maxim of law, and 
of natural justice, that one of the parties to a contract, cannot by his 
own act, exempt himself, from its obligation.” Even a state “could no 
more relieve itself from the obligation, by any act of its own, than an 
individual, who had signed a bond, could relieve himself from the 
necessity of payment.”18 By such arguments, Harper and Hamilton 
hoped to reassure the public of the validity of the grant and the 
security of the claims then being sold and resold. 
On the opposite side, Abraham Bishop wrote perhaps the most 
famous anti-Yazoo pamphlet.19 Bishop was a Connecticut Republican 
who evidently purchased a Yazoo claim substantially on credit. As he 
came to realize the multiple shadows on his title, he wrote the 
pamphlet as a polemic against the sellers who sought his remaining 
payments, explaining the Republican defense of Georgia’s refusal to 
recognize the grant. Starting with the assertion that Georgia had only 
contingent claims to the land in the first place, given that Indian 
nations remained in possession and that only the federal government 
could legally dispossess them, Bishop then vindicated the authority of 
 
 14 See ROBERT GOODLOE HARPER, THE CASE OF THE GEORGIA SALES ON THE MISSISSIPPI 
CONSIDERED, reprinted in MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 140-48. 
 15 See ALEXANDER HAMILTON, OPINION ON THE GEORGIA REPEAL ACT, reprinted in 
MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 149-50.  
 16 MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 141. 
 17 Id. at 141-42. 
 18 Id. at 142. 
 19 See ABRAHAM BISHOP, GEORGIA SPECULATION UNVEILED, reprinted in MAGRATH, 
supra note 6, at 152-71.  
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the state of Georgia to void a grant previously made. He asserted that, 
“This is the sovereign independent state of Georgia, having a right to 
make or repeal their own laws at pleasure, and this right wholly 
uncontrollable.” Moreover, the laws of Georgia “must be such as are 
recognized by the people, legally represented.” To him, it was obvious 
that “a legislature may declare a pretended act void” in any number of 
circumstances: when pretended to be enacted in the absence of a 
quorum; when the speaker or president of the body is bribed to 
misrepresent the outcome of the vote; when necessary votes come 
from those who have not taken prescribed oaths; and when the act 
violates the constitution or the votes come from those materially 
interested in the outcome. Such hypothetical and not so hypothetical 
circumstances drove home the fundamental point that a state was not 
the same as a private party to a contract but stood in a unique place. It 
was an independent sovereignty that must be able to control the 
question of what laws it had enacted and what “pretended acts” it 
might repudiate as void and no act of the state at all. “Take this power 
from a legislature, and where is the sovereignty of the state?”20 
As to the common law doctrines that would supposedly rescue the 
sellers of the Yazoo claims, Bishop lumped them with the many 
“delusions” under which he thought the sellers to be laboring. The 
notions that “a grant is in its nature irreversible” and that “book-
principles relating to real estate and to notes are in favor of the 
settlers” ran up against the more fundamental principles of 
sovereignty: since the Revolution, each state had gained and never 
relinquished sovereignty, Bishop presumed.21 Implicitly dismissing the 
idea that the Constitution had subjected the states to contract law 
enforceable in federal court, Bishop moved directly to the conclusion 
that “an independent power can make, or unmake grants at will; because 
no power can decide on the morality, equity, or policy of their 
measures.”22 Be legal doctrine what it may, the reasonings of judges 
and the traditions of the commercial law had only as much authority 
as the unreviewable will of the people chose to give them. Even if the 
sellers had all morality on their side, the fact would remain that the 
sovereign power on the other side was “beyond their control.”23 And, 
although Bishop’s polemic did not mention it, the Supreme Court’s 
recent failure to vitiate the sovereignty of the states offered Bishop 
good grounds for treating state sovereignty as a given. The Court had 
 
 20 MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 155. 
 21 See id. at 162-63. 
 22 Id. at 163.  
 23 Id.  
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attempted in Chisholm v. Georgia24 to render the states suable in 
federal court and thus subject to the general law of contracts, only to 
be soundly undone by the new Eleventh Amendment’s affirmation of 
state sovereignty under the Constitution.25 
The pamphlets helped set the terms of constitutional debate, but the 
fate of the claimants and the lands fell to Congress. And the 
Republicans in Congress were divided both by constitutional 
principles and by competing views of how to maintain the ascendancy 
of republicanism in the face of the continuing threat of Federalist 
aristocracy. In 1802, Congress made the Yazoo problem its own by 
negotiating Georgia’s cession of any claims it had to the territory 
(much has it had negotiated cession of western lands from several 
other states) in return for a payment of $1.25 million, also reserving 5 
million acres of the territory as a fund to satisfy any outstanding 
claims.26 At the same time, Congress created a commission of cabinet 
luminaries (Secretary of State James Madison, Secretary of the 
Treasury Albert Gallatin, and Attorney General Levi Lincoln) to 
investigate the claims to the territory and propose a resolution. 
Constituting most of Jefferson’s cabinet, these commissioners can 
fairly be seen as representing the views of Jefferson as well as 
themselves. The commissioners transmitted their report to Congress 
in February 1803.27 In the report, these legalists avoided vindicating 
popular constitutional control and distanced themselves from the idea 
that “the Legislature of the State of Georgia was competent” to void 
the land grant. At the same time, they expressed “no hesitation” in 
agreeing with Georgia that “the title of the claimants cannot be 
supported.” Still, the commissioners departed from the Georgian view 
on what to do with the claims. Notwithstanding the claimants’ lack of 
title, the commissioners “nevertheless, believe that the interests of the 
United States, the tranquility of those who may hereafter inhabit that 
territory, and various equitable considerations which may be urged in 
favor of most of the present claimants, render it expedient to enter 
into a compromise on reasonable terms.”28 
The commissioners did not explain further, but they had committed 
themselves to a few propositions: first, that the doctrine of states’ 
 
 24 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
 25 See WILLIAM R. CASTO, THE SUPREME COURT IN THE EARLY REPUBLIC 188-202 (1995). 
 26 See MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 35. 
 27 Id. at 36. 
 28 JAMES MADISON, ALBERT GALLATIN & LEVI LINCOLN, GEORGIA LAND CLAIMS, H.R. 
DOC. NO. 7-74 (Feb. 16, 1803), reprinted in 1 AMERICAN STATE PAPERS, PUBLIC LANDS 
120, 122 (Walter Lowrie ed., 1834). 
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rights probably did not go so far as to authorize a legislature to break 
the contract of a prior legislature, even if, second, the Yazoo claimants 
could not in fact sustain their “titles” under the law; and, third, many 
of the current claimants, lacking timely notice of the fraud, might have 
equitable claims of some sort — of a sort that might be recognized in 
court, presumably — even if what they bought was never actually 
good title. The report thus tried to straddle the positions of different 
parts of the Republican Party, opening room for political compromise 
on a question that the populist, states’-rights Radicals and the legalist 
Federalists both saw as a matter of pure constitutional principle. For 
the moderate Republicans, compromise was essential for multiple 
reasons: because they were sympathetic both to the populist principles 
of the Radicals and to the legalism of the Federalists; and because, as a 
practical matter, the party needed to conciliate powerful New England 
Republicans, who were deeply invested in Yazoo claims at the same 
time that they were indispensable to the ongoing dismantling of 
Federalist hegemony in its strongest region.29 
For John Randolph, Virginia’s radical leader of the House 
Republicans,30 however, principles of states’ rights and popular 
sovereignty were more important than the conciliation of nominal, 
New England Republicans. The latter relied on characteristically 
Federalist arguments to legitimate their morally corrupt claims. So 
these radicals, who generally could command a majority of the party 
but only a minority of the House, firmly opposed any compromise. To 
indulge any Yazoo claims at all and to disrespect the Georgia 
legislature’s reviewing authority was to bow to the legalist position 
that state and popular sovereignty must yield to judge-made 
commercial law. 
Congress had set aside 5 million acres of the Georgia cession for the 
purpose of settling claims to those lands in whatever way it ultimately 
chose. In early 1804, the House returned to the commissioners’ 
proposal that the government settle with the Yazoo claimants. Now 
Randolph drew a line in the sand, proposing a series of resolutions to 
the effect that “no part of the five millions of acres . . . shall be 
appropriated to quiet or compensate any claims derived under any act, 
or pretended act, of the State of Georgia” of 1795. The resolutions 
insisted on the radical proposition that legislators are always subject to 
the people’s overruling of their acts whenever they should stray from 
“the public good.” When legislators act “to promote their own private 
 
 29 See MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 30-31, 38-47. 
 30 See RICHARD E. ELLIS, THE JEFFERSONIAN CRISIS: COURTS AND POLITICS IN THE 
YOUNG REPUBLIC 19-20 (1971); id. at 39-49.  
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ends,” then “it is the inalienable right of a people . . . to revoke the 
authority thus abused, to resume the rights thus attempted to be 
bartered, and to abrogate the act thus endeavoring to betray them.”31 
There were at least two major problems with this assertion. First, the 
claim that the people could override the doings of the legislature 
contradicted the legalist notion that established principles of contract 
law as well as established principles of constitutional law limited what 
the people could do. But, second, even those who accepted the right of 
the people at any time to reclaim all delegated power and repudiate the 
contracts of their legislature still had to explain how one could tell 
when the people — as opposed to self-appointed demagogues — had 
spoken in this way. Nevertheless, Randolph confidently asserted that it 
was “the good people of Georgia, impressed with general indignation,” 
who voided the act, choosing for their mechanism the subsequent 
legislature’s rescinding act, enacted “under circumstances of peculiar 
solemnity, and finally sanctioned by the people, who have subsequently 
ingrafted it on their constitution . . . .”32 The “circumstances of peculiar 
solemnity” were not explained, but Randolph presumably referred not 
only to whatever mood hung over the capital as the legislature exercised 
its “conventional powers” but also to the collected acts of popular 
resistance to the original act, via grand juries, public gatherings, and the 
like.33 These doings, combined with the fact that the new Georgia 
Constitution of 1798 subsequently ratified the voiding of the original 
grant, were enough to demonstrate to Randolph’s satisfaction that the 
voiding of the grant was the act of the sovereign people.34 And, indeed, 
it seems fair to say that, if ever the people of a state stepped forward 
generally and unambiguously to vitiate an official act, then the people of 
Georgia did so in 1795. In all of the long congressional debate on the 
subject, no one (to my knowledge) tried to argue otherwise. Rather, 
defenders of the Yazoo claims merely insisted that, be the circumstances 
what they were, the Georgia legislature could never step into the shoes 
of a court to void a contract. 
When debate resumed on Randolph’s resolutions some days later, 
on March 7, 1804, Randolph sketched the current state of parties in 
the House, explaining that the hopeless minority of Federalists had 
successfully divided and conquered the huge majority that were the 
Republicans, manufacturing for the purpose disingenuous states’-
rights arguments in favor of the compromise. The defenders of the 
 
 31 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1039 (1804). 
 32 Id. at 1039-40. 
 33 See Georgia Repeal Act, supra note 7, at 135-36. 
 34 See 13 ANNALS OF CONG. 1039-40. 
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land sale now insisted that for Congress to question the validity of the 
1795 grant would be to invade the prerogatives of a sovereign state. 
An amused Randolph sardonically celebrated the Federalists’ 
conversion to states’ rights principles before ridiculing the idea that 
recognition of the Yazoo claims would properly respect states’ rights. 
Georgia itself had declared the invalidity of the putative statute, and 
states’-rights principles commanded Congress to respect that 
determination, not the prior fraud. Moreover, Randolph explained 
that, in instructing the commissioners on the scope of their authority 
to recognize and compromise this or that claim, the House could not 
avoid determining that the claims either had or had not a basis in law. 
Any indulgence of the claims amounted to a legitimation of the 1795 
grant and a congressional striking down of the 1796 declaration of 
unconstitutionality. The only rightful course available to the House, 
therefore, was to avoid such legitimation by recognizing Georgia’s own 
absolute voiding of all claims under the corrupt Yazoo grant. Here, he 
again outlined the evidence that this voiding was indeed the act of the 
state as a whole, supported by an allegedly unanimous people and 
subsequently enshrined in the state constitution itself.35 
The House ultimately voted to postpone any consideration of the 
resolutions and returned to the Yazoo issue in its next session, almost 
a year later. Randolph again took the lead for the Radicals, arguing 
that the law was on his side, but more importantly insisting that, even 
if it was not, the Yazoo claims constituted such an exceptional case 
that “municipal jurisprudence” could not be applied but only “first 
principles”: “Attorneys and judges do not decide the fate of empires.”36 
The case might be about land titles, but it did not belong in court. 
Rather, it belonged in the hands of the people of Georgia, who had 
already lived up to their responsibilities and declared the law void. 
In contrast to Randolph’s high-flying rhetoric, moderate Republican 
advocates of compromise insisted that the proposal did not involve the 
eternal fate of republicanism in its struggle with Federalist aristocracy. 
Rather, a compromise would simply reflect the fact that the claimants 
had just enough color to their legal claims that it behooved the United 
States to settle with them and remove the clouds on a vast tract of 
land. Thus, Representative James Elliot of Vermont, declaring himself 
as much a democratic republican as any in the House,37 noted that the 
 
 35 Id. at 1109-11. 
 36 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 1029-30 (1805). 
 37 See id. at 1041. Magrath labels Elliot a Federalist, but the available evidence 
suggests the accuracy of Elliot’s own declaration that he was a Republican. See Eugene 
L. Huddleston, Indians and Literature of the Federalist Era: The Case of James Elliot, 44 
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Georgia cession and Congress’s embrace of that cession certainly 
contemplated a pragmatic settlement of the claims. The matter was 
simple: 
We are about to make arrangements for carrying into effect a 
solemn stipulation in the treaty with Georgia, and a solemn act 
of our predecessors, by devoting a part of the five millions of 
acres, specially reserved for that purpose . . . to the 
extinguishment of the colorable claims of equitable 
claimants.38 
Extended debate over four days ended in seeming victory for the 
compromisers. The House voted by a small margin to endorse a report 
of the Committee of Claims that had recommended the appointment 
of a new commission with authority to settle the claims with finality.39 
Yet, when the Committee later reported a bill to implement that 
resolution, the House ignored it. 
Debates over the Yazoo claims would resurface in the next Congress 
as well, but the radicals always maintained enough strength to prevent 
any authorization of a settlement. The Yazooists consequently turned 
their attention to the courts. In fact, the collusive suit of Fletcher v. 
Peck had been pending without action in federal court in 
Massachusetts since June 1803.40 The parties were the buyer and seller 
of claims to substantial Yazoo lands, Fletcher nominally challenging 
Peck’s title. But, in reality, both hoped for a ruling that the claims were 
good so that Peck could sell and Fletcher could buy with profit to 
both. No one in the case sought to argue earnestly that the titles were 
invalid. But the suit did not move forward in 1803 or for the next 
several years. At that time, the Radicals were aggressively impeaching 
Federalist judges, convicting one in the Senate before coming up just 
short of conviction of Supreme Court Justice Samuel Chase in 1805.41 
It stands to reason that the Yazooists preferred to await the outcome of 
their claims in Congress, supported by the Administration, rather than 
press forward for vindication by judges who would be looking over 
their shoulders at an aggressive, anti-legalist Congress. By 1806, 
however, Congress had repeatedly failed to produce a compensation 
 
NEW ENG. Q. 221, 231-32 & n.44 (1971).  
 38 14 ANNALS OF CONG. 1041. 
 39 Id. at 1173. 
 40 Lindsay G. Robertson, “A Mere Feigned Case”: Rethinking the Fletcher v. Peck 
Conspiracy and Early Republican Legal Culture, 2000 UTAH L. REV. 249, 252-53. 
 41 See generally ELLIS, supra note 30, at 69-107 (detailing the events of Judge 
Pickering and Justice Chase’s impeachment proceedings). 
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law, and the threat of impeachment of federal judges had withered 
with Chase’s acquittal. The courts newly looked like the most eligible 
avenue for the Yazoo claimants, and so the Fletcher case was finally 
tried to a pro-Yazoo conclusion. But that was only the first step, since 
only a Supreme Court endorsement of that result would apply 
nationwide and have the sort of influence in Congress that the 
Yazooists wanted.42 
After years of efforts to compromise claims of between 35 and 50 
million acres for a mere 5 million acres, the case would now go up to 
the Supreme Court with at least the formal potential to grant the 
Yazooists the entire, vast tract of land. And when the case got to the 
Court, it found a Chief Justice who was himself both a seasoned land 
speculator and a vigorous common-law legalist.43 Although three of 
the five justices who would decide the case were Jefferson appointees, 
they generally shared Marshall’s legalism and yielded to his view of the 
case.44 
Marshall’s opinion45 largely recapitulated the legalist arguments that 
had been made at length by the pro-compromise members of 
Congress. Marshall insisted that the land grant was a contract within 
the meaning of the federal Contracts Clause. He then offered a kind of 
back-handed respect to state sovereignty by disregarding the charges 
of corruption. The Court would not disregard a statute bearing all the 
forms of a Georgia law.46 Of course, there was essentially no doubt 
that, in the most innocent version of events, the 1795 legislators had 
sold much of the state’s land to themselves, and further that Georgia 
had already decided for itself that the 1795 Act was no law. But, for 
Marshall, the people of a state had no power to say what its law was. 
The people, he insisted, could only act through their constitutionally 
authorized agents,47 not on their own. The task of declaring the law 
was for judges, not the people, and no court could recognize an 
attempt to “devest” property rights in the name of a state. Rather, 
“certain great principles of justice,” “those rules which would have 
regulated the decision of a judicial tribunal,” must always govern, and 
 
 42 See MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 50-59 (describing the Yazooists’ likely 
calculations). 
 43 NEWMYER, supra note 11, at 36-38. 
 44 MAGRATH, supra note 6, at 63. The Jeffersonian Justice Johnson did write a 
separate concurrence of some interest, but it did not substantially deviate from 
Marshall’s legalism. 
 45 Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87 (1810). 
 46 Id. at 129-31. 
 47 Id. at 132-33. 
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those rules included the rule of equity that protected good faith 
purchasers, even when sold a defective title.48 To suppose otherwise, 
Marshall argued, was to disregard the law and usurp the place of the 
judiciary, thus ignoring the very nature and limits of legislative power 
and the principle of separation of powers.49 Moreover, recognition of 
the legislative voiding of the sale would flout the federal Constitution’s 
“bill of rights for the people of each state”; that is, the Contracts 
Clause, as well as the bans on bills of attainder and ex post facto 
laws.50 To Marshall and other Federalists, Georgia’s legislature 
exhibited exactly the vices of the legislatures of the 1780s, the very 
legislative vices that the Constitution had been designed to prevent. 
The Yazooists’ resounding judicial victory, however, did not put 
money in their pockets. Various obstacles remained to their claiming 
and reselling land that was in a distant location and that, in many 
cases, already had settlers on it. So they returned to Congress once 
again.51 There, the Court’s opinion no doubt had some influence, but 
no one considered actually implementing the logical remedy implied 
by the court — recognition of the full title of the claimants to the vast 
area that would soon constitute most of Alabama and Mississippi. 
Rather, while Radical Republican orthodoxy continued to impede the 
progress of a compensation bill, the imperative of facilitating 
settlement finally overcame the lingering congressional doubts about 
the “‘strict legality’ of the claimants’ title.”52 In 1814, Congress at last 
enacted a compensation law, appropriating the long-reserved 5 million 
acres for the purpose of settling the claims. The Yazooists, for their 
part, unhesitatingly accepted this roughly one-eighth compensation 
for the “titles” that the Court had impotently recognized.53 
Fletcher had thus failed to control the question of the Yazoo claims, 
proving the Court just one of several important sources of legal and 
constitutional meaning. But it illuminated the range of 
constitutionalisms available in the generation after ratification of the 
Constitution. For the heirs of the most radical Antifederalists, the 
events in Georgia enacted the true meaning of popular sovereignty. 
Moderate Republicans, however, embraced a pragmatic legalism, 
defending all at once the forms of law, states’ rights, and pragmatic 
political compromise. For moderates, unorthodox manifestations of 
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 50 Id. at 137-38. 
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“popular sovereignty” were not the way to go, but neither was 
unthinking deference to the courts. Rather, Congress had its own 
important role in giving operative meaning to the Constitution, just as 
the Court had its role. In the Yazoo case, for example, Congress 
attended to lawyerly considerations, both to doubt the “strict legality” 
of the original sale and at the same time to respect the grounds on 
which the Court defended the equitable claims of innocent purchasers. 
But that did not mean that Congress would simply defer to a judicial 
perspective on the claims. Rather, it sought to settle the legal and 
constitutional claims in the political arena, recognizing but 
compromising both the legal claims of the Yazooists and the claims to 
sovereignty of Georgia and the American people more generally. 
On the Supreme Court and among the Federalists, common-law 
legalism reigned. The Court deemed itself the only legitimate and 
reliable source of legal interpretation. And it used its special status to 
sanctify those rights of property and contract that it thought the 
foundation of civilization as well as the core values of the Constitution 
itself. To Marshall, Fletcher’s importance lay not in its pioneering 
invalidation of a state law but in its vindication of a legalist, common-
law Constitution. 
In sum, the original Constitution had indeed represented an 
important victory for the conservative forces of 1787–1788, but the 
story of the Yazoo scandal and Fletcher v. Peck demonstrates that that 
victory carried only so far. While Marshall, the Federalists, and the 
Supreme Court did all in their power to vindicate the common-law 
Constitution of contract and property rights along with judicial 
supremacy, they could not control the meaning of the Constitution in 
practice. The radical heirs of the Antifederalists gained office in large 
numbers, ultimately driving the ascendancy of the Jacksonian 
Democratic Party and the marginalization of the Court.54 And, as the 
Yazoo events illustrated, they insisted on a populist Constitution that 
empowered the people to override the doings of their legislatures and 
their courts alike, determining for themselves when their agents had 
strayed from their delegated tasks and reserving to themselves the final 
authority to say what the law was and to dispose of legal claims. 
Meanwhile, the moderate, legalist Republicans insisted on a 
Constitution that neither resorted to direct popular control of legal 
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claims nor erased popular will in deference to judicial claims of special 
expertise. Rather, consistent with Jefferson’s famously departmentalist 
approach to constitutional interpretation,55 all branches of government 
and the people themselves had rightful claims to interpret the 
Constitution when acting within their legitimate spheres. The people 
of Georgia might instruct their legislature to disregard an act they 
disapproved. Marshall and the Court would necessarily interpret the 
law and the Constitution when resolving Fletcher’s claim against Peck, 
however feigned. But none of that prevented Congress too from 
stepping in to take the larger, national view of the controversy and 
interpose a statutory settlement of all claims. That settlement became 
final not because the courts or the people were constitutionally 
required to accede to Congress’s will but because, by 1814, the nation 
was finally ready to accept that settlement. Future constitutional 
controversies, similarly, might be settled by popular movements, by 
state action, by congressional action, or by the courts, as 
circumstances dictated. But no dogma of constitutional authority — 
including Marshall’s insistence that the Constitution had granted 
supremacy to the Supreme Court56 — would ever grasp final victory. 
 
 
 55 See, e.g., ELLIS, supra note 30, at 66 (describing Jefferson’s view that each branch 
is empowered to decide constitutional issues). 
 56 Beyond the implications of Fletcher on this point, see McCulloch v. Maryland, 
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 400-01 (1819). 
